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THE CASE FOR RELIGIOUS VALUES IN
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
WENDELL

L. GRIFFEN*

Perhaps few things are as troubling to contemporary minds in the
United States as the prospect that religious values will somehow affect
the way public policy is shaped. Judging from the writings of respected
thinkers such as Professor Kent Greenawalt of Columbia Law School,1
Professor Stephen Carter of Yale,2 and the views of political leaders
such as former New York Governor Mario Cuomo3 and former VicePresidential candidate Geraldine Ferraro, there is considerable
anxiety-if not outright fear and hostility-about the role that religious
values play in the way that policy makers understand and justify their
public policy positions. The judicial branch has not been immune from
this concern or untouched by it. Justice Antonin Scalia of the United
States Supreme Court has been criticized for expressing his religious
views in public speeches, with the criticism apparently based on fear
that his reasoning either signals a prejudiced disposition inappropriate
for a judge, or that it suggests a favorable attitude about using religious
values to shape judicial decisions.! A judge in Alabama has become
controversial because he posted a copy of the Ten Commandments in
* Judge, Arkansas Court of Appeals, and Pastor, Emmanuel Baptist Church of Little
Rock, Arkansas. I am especially grateful to Dean Howard Eisenberg and Assistant
Professor Scott Idleman of Marquette Law School for the invitation to participate in this
conference, and for the courtesy extended to me during my stay. I am also indebted to
Colette Dodson Honorable, one of Dean Eisenberg's students during his tenure as Dean of
the University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law School, who now serves as my law clerk and
has helped me to develop this paper for presentation. Finally, I appreciate the comments
and observations given to me during and after the Marquette conference by the panelists
who responded to the ideas advanced in this paper, as well as the comments of other
informed observers on this issue.
1. See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICrIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE

(1988).
2. See Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE
(1989).

DAME

L. REv. 932

3. See Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's
Perspective, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 13 (1984).

4. See David Barringer, Higher Authorities, 82 A.B.A. J. 68 (Dec. 1996). The article
briefly mentions the controversy that followed Justice Scalia's speech at a prayer breakfast
sponsored by the Christian Legal Society at the Mississippi College School of Law in April
1996.
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his courtroom. 5 In Idaho v. Freeman,6 a litigant sought the recusal of a
federal district judge because he was a member and leader in the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Mormon). In Feminist
Women's Health Center. v. Codispoti,7 an abortion clinic filed motions

seeking the recusal of Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, alleging that his "'fervently-held
religious beliefs would compromise [his] ability to apply the law."' 8
Both cases involved explicit arguments that the judges were somehow
impaired in their abilities to reason because they held religious beliefs.
As a sitting state appeals court judge and Baptist pastor, I view
these developments with interest and regret. I do not believe that the
public policy process is necessarily threatened when judges include
religious values in judicial decision-making, despite the considerable
discomfort that is expressed in liberal political theory. To the contrary,
the prevailing aversion to any influential role that religious values might
play in judicial decision-making does a disservice to the deliberative
processes that judges employ and deprives society of the benefit that
may be obtained from an open and uninhibited debate of various
sources of moral knowledge. It also dehumanizes religiously devout
judges by requiring them to either abandon the role of religious faith in
their concept of moral knowledge or falsely mask the operation of that
faith in the deliberative process.9 Instead of treating religious values as
inherently suspect when held by judges, or as automatically
impermissible factors for influencing judicial decision-making, we ought
to honestly consider the way that religious values can operate within the
decision-making process consistent with our views of pluralism and
religious tolerance, tempered by our concern for the Establishment
Clause to the First Amendment of the federal Constitution. We are not
likely to do so, however, while we hold the notion that religious values
are somehow more offensive to the way that judges decide than
economic values, social values, political ideology, or other secular
values that influence the way that judicial decisions are reached.

5. House Offers Support for Alabama Judge in Ten Commandments Dispute, L.A.
TIMES, March 6, 1997, at A16.
6. 478 F. Supp. 33 (D. Idaho 1979).
7. 69 F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 1995).
8. See Codispoti,69 F.3d at 400 (quoting plaintiffs petition).
9. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 213-32 (1993).
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I. JUDGES ARE VALUE-SENSITIVE PEOPLE IN A VALUE-RIDDEN
PROCESS

The idea that religious values must not influence judicial decision
making is a direct assault on the idea that judges are value-sensitive
people who may properly be concerned about issues of ultimate
concern. After all, religious values address what the theologian Paul
Tillich called matters of "ultimate concern" as opposed to matters of

"preliminary concern."'
Religion ascribes meaning
to human
existence that both transcends and encompasses the sensory,
intellectual, emotional, social, political, and cultural elements of our
being. To view life, relationships, responsibilities, and conduct with
concern for that ultimate meaning is to view it religiously. To be sure, it
is both possible and, apparently, popular to view life, relationships,
responsibilities, and conduct without regard for ultimate meaning or
one's relationship to ultimate meaning. However (and we must never
forget this as we ponder the way that religious values may or may not
influence judicial decision-making), the choice about whether to view
human existence, conduct, and the exercise of one's professional and
other responsibilities in terms of ultimate meaning is a choice about
values (and religious values) that only value-sensitive and valuesensible beings can make.

Judges are value-sensitive and value-sensible creatures, and our
work involves deciding how to apply principles of jurisprudence to the
10. PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 11-15 (1951). In discussing this view of

religious experience in terms of "ultimate concern," Tillich wrote:
Ultimate concern is the abstract translation of the great commandment: "The Lord,
our God, the Lord is one; and you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart,
and with all your soul and with all your mind, and with all your strength." [Mark
12:29 (Revised Standard Version)] The religious concern is ultimate; it excludes all
other concerns from ultimate significance; it makes them preliminary. The ultimate
concern is unconditional, independent of any conditions of character, desire, or
circumstance. The unconditional concern is totak no part of ourselves or of our
world is excluded from it; there is no "place" to flee from iL [Psalm 139] The total
concern is infinite: no moment of relaxation and rest is possible in the face of a
religious concern which is ultimate, unconditional total, and infinite. The word

"concern" points to the "existential" character of religious experience. We cannot
speak adequately of the "object of religion" without simultaneously removing its
character as an object. That which is ultimate gives itself only to the attitude of
ultimate concern. It is the correlate of an unconditional concern but not a "highest
thing" called "the absolute" or "the unconditioned," about which we could argue in

detached objectivity. It is the object of total surrender,demanding also the surrender
of our subjectivity while we look at iL It is a matter of infinite passion and interest
(Kierkegaard),making us its object whenever we try to make it our objecL

lIdat 11-12.
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competing aspirations of litigating parties. Just as economic values,
social values, values about political ideology and the function of
government in human society, and values about risks and benefits can
be analyzed and included in the jurisprudential way judges decide cases
and controversies, religious values can also be analyzed and included
jurisprudentially. In fact, if religious values really do address issues of
ultimate concern that transcend and encompass all other or
"preliminary" concerns, it is unrealistic to demand that a person who is
sincere in her religious conviction disown or discount that conviction
when she assumes judicial office, when she ponders cases, and when
she explains the reasons for her decisions. Also, the judicial power is
not exercised or held in a moral vacuum. Power is never morally
neutral, whether exercised by voters, by legislators, executive officers,
or judges.
Rather than suspecting the reasoning of the judge who honestly
includes her religious values in that process, we should suspect the judge
who maintains that he is being intellectually honest about judicial
decision-making devoid of the religious values that he professes to hold.
For example, in my state (Arkansas) as in many other jurisdictions,
judges are elected by popular vote. In many instances the candidates
for judicial office include their religious affiliation in their campaign
materials. This is a flagrant assertion of religious identity and a
suggestion that the candidates are influenced by considerations of
ultimate meaning that they believe voters need to recognize. But many
respected observers of the judicial process believe that when the
successful judicial candidates assume office after winning the election,
they should either jettison their religious beliefs or refuse to be
influenced by them when deciding cases. Requiring religiously devout
judges to jettison their faith when they decide cases, after permitting
them to tout their faith in order to be trusted with judicial office, is
illogical. Suggesting that religiously devout judges must refuse to be
influenced by their faith when they work invites intellectual dishonesty
at best, hypocrisy at worst. After all, hypocrisy is merely the act of
feigning to be what one is not, or to believe what one does not.
Hypocrisy disguised as political orthodoxy is nonetheless hypocritical,
however convenient it may be for the hypocrite or however comfortable
it may leave those who are uneasy with views different from that
professed orthodoxy.
II. THE MYTH OF LEGAL POSITIVISM
Much of the concern about the legitimacy and propriety of judges
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considering religious values in reaching judicial decisions stems from
what I consider an unwarranted faith-and one can hardly call it
anything but faith-in legal positivism. Judges, we are told, must serve
society by reasoning their way to results based on commonly accepted
rules and principles of law in the society. We claim to respect the role
of moral knowledge in helping us think and debate our varying ideas
about what the legal principles should be, and we profess a desire to
have men and women serve as judges who possess moral knowledge.
But we want the moral knowledge to originate from secular sources, not
We not only favor the secular sources of
those that are religious."
moral knowledge, we are deeply suspicious about moral knowledge
based on religious conviction. As Dean Ronald Thiemann of Harvard
Divinity School reminded us yesterday, religious values are dismissed as
inappropriate because they are deemed as either irrational or nonrational, and therefore, unsuitable in moving political discourse toward
the consensus required by liberal democratic theory.
Even when observers such as Kent Greenawalt have propounded
theories affirming the legitimacy of moral ideas influenced by religious
conviction in public policy discussions, they appear to hold that the
moral ideas held by the policy makers should be justified in secular
terms.12 While this is far better than forbidding religious values from
any role in the formulation of moral ideas concerning issues of public
policy, even this approach would force religiously devout judges to
disavow an essential part of their personalities, as Stephen Carter has
The idea that the religiously devout judge can consider
observed.'
religious values in the decision-making process as long as those values
are stated in secular terms is merely another variation of the disavowal
process, as if to say that it is all right for the religiously devout judge to

supra note 1, at 239-41. See also KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE
141-50 (1995). Professor Greenawalt addressed this
concern more expansively herein, and treated the concerns about judges relying upon their
personal religious values.
12. GREENAWALT, supra note 1, at 239. Greenawalt states that, "[w]hat is legally
relevant is generally conceived to be the same for all judges, so neither personal religious
convictions nor any other idiosyncratic convictions are legally relevant. Given this
understanding about judicial opinions, it follows that opinions should not contain direct
references to the religious premises of judges." However, Greenawalt also observes that the
model of judicial decision-making that holds judges to determine results based on existing
legal materials is implausible because of the category of cases where "no determinate answer
can be derived from existing legal materials." Id. at 240. In doing so, Greenawalt has
accurately noted that legal terms such as "cruel and unusual punishment" or "good moral
character," seem to refer the judge outward to non-legal domains. Id
13. Carter, supra note 2.
11.

GREENAWALT,

CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS
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include her religious values during the deliberative process so long as
she does not act as if those values affect her decisions.
III. THE FREEDOM TO HEAR AND THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD
I continue to be guided by something that Robert Knowlton, the
Distinguished Professor of Law at Rutgers University who spent his last
teaching years at the University of Arkansas School of Law, said during
his commencement speech to my law school graduating class.
Knowlton urged us, in our work as lawyers, to keep an open mind to all
knowledge from whatever source or discipline it may come. I think his
words apply as well to the work that judges do. Judges must be openminded to all sources of truth if we are to be competent deliberators of
the value-laden issues brought for our decision. We are free to hear the
voices of religious values, mathematical principles, classical literature,
popular music, and quotations by Sherlock Holmes in our effort to
understand the issues we must consider. This is another way of saying
that judges are free to hear the voices of William Shakespeare, Sir
Arthur Conan Doyle, John Locke, Robert Browning, Johann Wolfgang
von Goethe, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Moses, Jesus, Sojourner Truth,
Frederick Douglass, and Martin Luther King, Jr., without
embarrassment or hesitation as we deliberate.
We also have the right to include religious sources when we justify
the decisions we reach. Religious values are neither more, nor less,
appropriate factors for justifying judicial decisions from a philosophical
perspective. As far as moral philosophy is concerned, religious
convictions are neither irrational nor non-rational; rather, faith is transrational, as Gardner Taylor has said. 14 Appeals to trans-rational
arguments and sources are not illegitimate or unattainable. Granted,
religious values are not universally shared by all persons, or even all
judges for that matter. The same is true about every other kind of
knowledge that affects judicial decision-making. All judges do not
share the same knowledge of history, economics, literature,
mathematics, science, and the arts either, let alone agree about these
things. Neither uniformity nor unanimity of thought is demanded or
desired in the process of judicial decision-making.
The point is not that all persons or all judges hear (or should hear)
the same voices, but that all the voices have a right to be heard and
14. Taylor, Senior Pastor Emeritus of the Concord Baptist Church of Christ, Brooklyn,
New York, remarked that, "faith is trans-rational." Lecture at the E.C. Morris Ministers
Institute held at Arkansas Baptist College, Little Rock, Arkansas, March 28, 1996.
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articulated in the process that judges use to reach and justify our
decisions.15 This also means that all the voices (including those of
religious faith) have the right to be challenged and criticized within the
judicial decision-making process. The mere fact that religious voices
are different from others does not make them less reliable, less
articulable, or less deserving of consideration and assertion, nor are
they less susceptible to candid criticism and debate in the judicial
context. The best way that society can assure itself that religious values
do not improperly influence judicial decision-making is by permitting
them to enter the intellectual competition of competing moral views
where they will be examined, challenged, debated, and defended as
more or less helpful means of reaching just decisions.
IV. How CAN DEVOUT JUDGES RESORT TO FAITH
Religiously devout judges may state legal problems in both their
existential and their ontological contexts. After all, the whole idea that
law serves to advance the end of justice involves that analysis. As
judges, we are bound to uphold and apply the law of our forums. That
existential duty is taken, however, to fulfill the ontological demands of
justice. Law is the preliminary concern; justice is the ultimate concern.
The devout judge can-and some may argue should-analyze legal
problems from both perspectives. Doing so will necessarily mean
considering religious convictions concerning the meaning of justice on
those existential issues not already determined by existing legal
materials. To the extent that faith informs and shapes a judge's
understanding of justice-and to the extent that religious teachings
within the society contribute to some larger and wider sense of justice
within the society-the devout judge does a vital service by openly
considering the existential rule of law and the ontological imperatives of
justice.
Justice and legal rules may not, and will not, always be congruent.
15. Stephen Carter stated the issue succinctly and well when he said:
What is needed is not a requirement that the religiously devout choose a form of
dialogue that liberalism accepts, but that liberalism develop a politics that accepts
whatever form of dialogue a member of the public offers. Epistemic diversity, like
diversity of other kinds, should be cherished, not ignored, and certainly not
abolished. What is needed, then, is a willingness to listen, not because the speaker
has the right voice but because the speaker has the right to speak. Moreover, the
willingness to listen must hold out the possibility that the speaker is saying
something worth listening to; to do less is to trivialize the forces that shape the
moral convictions of tens of millions of Americans.
CARTER,

supra note 9, at 230.
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The devout judge serves a vital role in those cases of incongruence or
conflict by recognizing that the demand of the law appears to conflict
with justice. By doing so, the devout judge necessarily relies upon
religious convictions, even when rendering judgments according to the
prevailing legal standards that do not comport with the judge's
understanding of justice. If the judge dissents because a rule of law is
unsound, does that dissent take any less force because the rule of law is
seen as unjust? If the judge concurs in a judgment because the law is
clear, however much the law may appear to fall short of the ultimate
concern of justice, the judge can nevertheless do so despite a concern
that the law does not serve justice, and should be free to express the
reservation about the justness of the result. Of course, the devout judge
may also be moved to recuse from cases that present an unacceptable
conflict between law and justice. When doing so, the judge apparently
decides that it would not be right to participate in a case because of
what is perceived as an unacceptable conflict between the preliminary
concern of law and the ultimate concern of justice.
The devout judge may not, and should not, substitute religious
conviction for judicial analysis when existing legal material is at hand.
Murder is punished as a crime because society agrees that the
unjustified taking of human life is wrong, not simply because the Sixth
Commandment reads "Thou Shalt Not Kill." The devout judge who
relies on religious conviction as the sole basis for judicial decisionmaking is acting as a prelate, not as a jurist. The judge whose notion of
justice includes a sensitivity for the interplay of religious and other
values in the decision-making process is reasoning judicially, even when
including religious values in the reasoning.
Finally, devout judges must remain sensitive to the important role
that religious values and their proper expression serve within a
pluralistic society. If the devout judge does not remind society that
certain conduct is condemned as offensive to domestic tranquillity,
contrary to the laws of nature, or inconsistent with truth, then society is
denied the value of that information and judgment in its pursuit of
justice. The give-and-take of competing moral, behavioral, intellectual,
and cultural philosophies is how a pluralist society operates. The
devout judge, as a citizen of two societies, helps society remain pluralist
by thinking and acting in a holistic way, not by trivializing religious
conviction.
V. CONCLUSION

Bob Knowlton ended his commencement speech by reminding my
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graduating class that Learned Hand said justice should not be rationed.
I think this also means that the sources from which we obtain our
conceptions of justice should not be artificially restricted. We must
certainly deliberate and debate their validity with vigorous diligence out
of proper regard for sound reasoning. Our debate must include
deference to the constitutional protection contained in the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. However, a decisionmaking process built on concealing entire spheres of moral knowledge
such as that constituted by religious values is not likely to produce a
full-bodied sense of justice, however sophisticated its body of law is
perceived to be.
We must learn to listen to the voices that impart moral knowledge
with open and sharp minds. We will not always agree with what we
hear, but even that is not bad. By listening to and debating the
messages of religious values (along with other sources of moral
knowledge) that can apply to judicial decision-making, we will increase
the chances of reaching decisions that are just. In the final analysis, that
is simply another way of saying that we will increase the chances of
reaching decisions that are right, even if we argue about whether we are
doing so, and even if we disagree about what "right" or "just"
ultimately mean.

